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The COVID-19 pandemic is a major global threat, with25,327,098 cases and 848,255 deaths confirmed as of 1September 20201. The majority of countries have respon-
ded to the threat by implementing various non-pharmaceutical
interventions, with many opting for society-wide suppression
measures in an effort to prevent unacceptable loss of life2.
However, a number of conflict-affected countries in Africa and
West Asia, e.g. Sudan, Syria, and Yemen, have reported no sharp
increases in mortality of the scale predicted by multiple modelling
studies, even where interventions were limited3,4. These obser-
vations are hard to reconcile with contemporaneous reports of
hospitals becoming overwhelmed in these settings5,6. Addition-
ally, many settings with very low observed mortality are now
reporting that cases and hospital bed demand are falling despite
no notable change in implemented interventions or behaviour
change, which may suggest that the epidemic has passed its peak7.
Consequently, alternative explanations have been sought to
understand the heterogeneity in the magnitude of COVID-19
epidemics, including the effects of climate8, population density9,
inter-pathogen effects10, younger populations11 and BCG
vaccination12 on COVID-19 transmission or clinical severity.
One alternative (or concurrent) explanation, which has gar-
nered less attention within the scientific literature despite
numerous reports in the media13,14, is that COVID-19 related
deaths have been substantially under-ascertained in some coun-
tries. Under-ascertainment of COVID-19 symptomatic cases has
been recognised as an issue in many high and low-income set-
tings, due to factors such as limited testing capacity and the non-
specific symptoms of mild disease15. Because clinically severe
cases are more likely to be recognised and tested16, mortality data
have been viewed as a more reliable datastream for cross-country
comparisons and for tracking epidemics17. However, under-
ascertainment of COVID-19 deaths is known to occur, with
investigations comparing excess mortality and reported lab-
confirmed COVID-19 deaths revealing substantial discrepancies,
particularly at the beginning of epidemics and at the peak of
transmission14,18. Consequently, all-cause, excess population
mortality has been considered the most reliable data for com-
paring the magnitude and trajectory of COVID-19 epidemics
across countries19. Unfortunately, real-time estimates of all-cause
mortality are unavailable for many conflict-affected countries
where comprehensive vital registration systems may be lacking or
poorly-functioning and data sharing may be restricted20.
Motivated by reports of an overwhelmed health system21 and
widespread under-ascertainment of deaths22 we sought to
understand the evolving COVID-19 epidemic in Syria, a former
middle-income country, now classified as low-income by the
World Bank for 2020–2021 after the destructive ongoing conflict.
Before 2011, health indicators in Syria had improved considerably
and the country had begun its epidemiological transition with
77% of mortality due to non-communicable diseases23. However,
pre-conflict health system challenges surrounding among other
issues, data validity and transparency, inadequate healthcare
provider coordination and staffing levels as well as uncontrolled
private-sector expansion, all contributed to uneven regional
health services distribution23. The March 2011 uprising, violent
government response, and escalated armed conflict since mid-
2012 is well documented24. Waves of population displacement
has meant an estimated 11.7 million people in Syria needed
humanitarian health assistance in 201924,25. The protracted
conflict, entailing dynamic shifts in conflict lines and political
boundaries, has fragmented the country’s governance among
opposing military forces including the Syrian government,
opposition groups, Syrian Democratic forces, and Turkish
forces24. This has fragmented the country’s governance and led to
shortages of supplies and equipment, systematic targeting of
healthcare facilities and staff and the forced migration of skilled
healthcare professionals. These issues have contributed to an
increasingly fragmented and politicised health system26,27 that
reflects a compromised response to health needs but in which
essential accountability, transparency, and information sharing
across areas-of-control is only possible with external support26.
This study contributes analysis of a novel data source to improve
transparency within Syria, support greater accountability and
demonstrate an approach that could be used for similar research
in other conflict-affected and resource-constrained settings.
Results
Estimating the under-ascertainment of deaths in the first wave
in Damascus. In this study, we focus on reports from the capital
city, Damascus, where 832 deaths were recorded by the mortuary
office between 25 July and 1 August, an average of 104 per day
(Supplementary Table 3)28. All-cause mortality data is not rou-
tinely published and the 8 days of data were only published by the
mortuary office in response to public pressure for transparency.
The reported deaths are significantly in excess of estimates of pre-
pandemic expected daily mortality, namely 32 deaths per day
given annual mortality for Damascus reported by the Syrian
Central Bureau of Statistics29. One week earlier, the director of
the Damascus office for burial of the dead suggested that the pre-
pandemic daily mortality in Damascus during this period of the
year was ‘~40 deaths, a normal figure in the summer as deaths
increase due to high heat’30. This estimate is in line with reports
from 2016 by the same director that daily deaths are in the range
of 15–50 deaths per day31. Applying these broadly consistent pre-
pandemic baselines, we compute approximate excess mortality by
subtracting an assumed baseline mortality of 32 deaths per day,
which we use to infer the level of under-ascertainment of
COVID-19 deaths in Damascus prior to 2 September. This esti-
mate of excess mortality is only an approximate one and may
underestimate true excess mortality if the deaths reported
between 25 July and 1 August are themselves an under-
ascertainment. In addition, we consider a higher baseline mor-
tality of 64 deaths per day to explore increased indirect effects of
COVID-19 on mortality.
We fit a previously published3 age-structured COVID-19
transmission model to the official reported daily COVID-19
deaths in Damascus governorate (Supplementary Table 4). The
model is a population-based age-structured Susceptible-Exposed-
Infected-Recovered model, which explicitly represents disease
severity and passage through different healthcare levels (Supple-
mentary Methods). To infer changes in transmission, we estimate
the impact of implemented non-pharmaceutical interventions in
Damascus (Supplementary Table 5), which started on 13 March
with most interventions being relaxed on 26 May. To estimate the
under-ascertainment of COVID-19 deaths, we assume that a
constant proportion of the model-predicted COVID-19 deaths on
a given day are ascertained and reported. Using this assumption,
the trajectory of official reported deaths should mirror the shape
of the epidemic after accounting for under-ascertainment. We
scan across a range of under-ascertainment levels to relate the
deaths predicted by the model to official reported deaths.
We identify the most likely level of mortality under-
ascertainment by comparing the total predicted COVID-19
deaths between 25 July and 1 August from the transmission
model against the excess mortality estimated from government-
reported all-cause mortality data in Damascus for the same
period. Given the extensive changes to Syrian demography and
health services resulting from war, and ongoing uncertainty
regarding key COVID-19 parameters, we conducted an extensive
sensitivity analysis, exploring the impact that the assumed
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demography, population size in Damascus, healthcare capacity,
infection fatality ratios (IFRs) and baseline daily mortality have
on the estimated level of under-ascertainment (Supplementary
Table 6 for all model inputs explored).
As of 2 September 2020, 60 COVID-19 related deaths were
reported in Damascus governorate (Supplementary Fig. 3). We
estimate that this comprises 1.25% of total COVID-19 deaths,
with an estimated 4440 COVID-19 deaths (95% CI: 3310–5600)
by 2 September 2020 (Fig. 1). This was determined by comparing
the model-predicted COVID-19 deaths between 25 July and 1
August to the excess mortality under the assumption that all
excess deaths are due to COVID-19 (Fig. 1a). If we double our
assumed baseline death rate from 32 to 64 deaths per day, we still
estimate substantial under-ascertainment with an estimated 2% of
deaths due to COVID-19 being reported as such (Fig. 1b). To
explore the reliability of these model fits, we also looked at reports
of hospitals reaching capacity in Damascus, resulting in patients
being treated at home. These reports vary, but there is consensus
that individuals were reluctant to go to hospitals between 17
July32 and 30 July33 due to hospitals reaching capacity and having
to turn away patients. With our default parameters, we predict
that hospital capacity would have been reached during this period
with an assumed under-ascertainment of deaths between 1 and
1.25% (Fig. 1c). This lends further support to our inferred most
likely under-ascertainment of 1.25%. This finding is dependent
on the assumed number of hospital beds available, which is
unknown due to uncertainty in the number of functional beds
across both public and private hospitals. However, in our
sensitivity analysis the best model fit to mortality data was
obtained assuming ~2000 hospital beds were available, consistent
with the value of 1935 beds used to generate our central estimates













Fig. 1 Estimates of under-ascertainment of deaths in Damascus. In (a) the daily model-predicted COVID-19 deaths in Damascus are shown using the
default model parameters and a range of values for the under-ascertainment of COVID-19 deaths. These are compared to the excess mortality reported by
the government during 25 July–1 August, which is shown with point ranges, with estimates assuming a baseline of 32 and 64 deaths per day shown with a
circle and triangle respectively. Trajectories with 0.05 and 0.1% of deaths reported are not shown above 200 daily deaths to ease viewing of other curves.
In (b) the log likelihood for each level of under-ascertainment is shown for different assumed baseline mortality. Model log likelihoods presented reflect the
mean model log likelihood across the full sensitivity analysis conducted (n= 14,000), suggesting that under-ascertainment is likely between 1 and 3%
when viewed across both baseline mortality estimates. The box represents the median and interquartile range (IQR) and whiskers represent the IQR ±
1.5*IQR with points depicting values outside this range. In (c) the model-predicted hospital occupancy for the simulations in (a) are shown. The hospital
capacity for Damascus is shown with a dashed horizontal line, with the 2-week period in which hospitals were reported to be first at capacity shown shaded
in red. In both (a, c) the median of 100 draws from the posterior parameter space are presented for visualisation purposes.
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to be robust to varying assumptions about the population size and
demography of the Damascus population. However, we obtained
a better model fit when we assumed a higher IFR than given by
the Verity et al. estimates34. Higher IFRs are plausible if access to
oxygen support was limited at the peak of the epidemic3. This is
unknown, however, anonymous testimonials from Damascus
report individuals trying to buy their own oxygen during the peak
in transmission suggesting35. Looking across the full range of
assumptions examined in the sensitivity analysis, we estimate that
between 1 and 3% of deaths due to COVID-19 were ascertained
and reported.
The excess mortality recorded between 25 July and 1 August
provided a small window to analyse the COVID-19 epidemic in
Damascus. Given the limited amount of data, it is hard to be
confident in the predicted epidemic dynamics. For example, in
Fig. 1c, the model predicts that the demand for hospital beds
started to decrease by the end of August. However, there are
multiple possible epidemic trajectories that could yield
the number of excess deaths reported. In Supplementary Fig. 5,
we explore three alternative scenarios and their compatibility with
the observed data. We identified one of these (Supplementary
Fig. 5D)—a scenario assuming that only COVID-19 deaths
occurring in hospitals are reported—as showing a comparably
good fit to all available data (i.e. reported daily deaths, excess
deaths and the timing of the health system reaching capacity).
This alternative scenario would imply 0.28% (95% CI:
0.24–0.39%) of total COVID-19 deaths are reported (Supple-
mentary Fig. 6) and predicts a significantly larger number of
excess deaths compared to the original analysis, with 21,260
deaths (95% CI: 15,360–24,860) estimated by 2 September 2020
(Supplementary Fig. 7). Given the approximate fivefold increase
in estimated deaths compared to the earlier estimate of 4400
deaths, and without the ability to verify whether reported deaths
encompass both hospital and community deaths, we sought to
gain an alternative source of data to confirm mortality trends in
Damascus.
Estimating excess mortality in Damascus from obituary noti-
fications. Traditionally, when individuals die in Damascus, a
paper notification of death is printed and affixed to household
walls in nearby neighbourhoods of the deceased. These notifica-
tions include information, such as the date of death, details of the
deceased’s relatives and the consolation events being held.
However, due to internal displacements and a high number of
Syrians leaving the country due to recent conflict, a community
maintained Facebook page (‘Damascus Mortality’36) was estab-
lished to inform people about deaths in Damascus. On this page,
images of the notifications produced by printing shops in
Damascus are routinely uploaded with the majority of images
uploaded within 24 h of the noted date of death. From analysing
the noted date of death, all images are uploaded within 5 days
after death, with a mean delay of 0.49 days. Despite the
informality of this process, the observed mortality trends in this
alternative data source reveal a consistent baseline of ~300 noti-
fications per month in 2017–2019 (Fig. 2a), which represents
27.5% of annual reported mortality. By contrast, uploaded noti-
fications rose to 809 in July and 1066 in August 2020.
To obtain an additional view of the epidemic in Damascus, we
separately fitted our transmission model to the notification data.
We calculated the excess notification deaths for 2020 by
subtracting the mean number of notifications uploaded daily in
2017–2019 for each month from those reported in 2020. The
inferred estimates suggest that excess deaths increased from the
Fig. 2 Community-uploaded death notifications in Damascus and the inferred epidemic trajectory. In (a) we show the number of obituary notification
photos uploaded monthly to the community maintained ‘Damascus Mortality’ Facebook page revealing a substantial increase in July and August 2020.
This is in contrast to the consistent monthly number of notifications uploaded between 2016 and 2020. In (b), the daily inferred excess death notifications
are shown, with error bars showing the 95% CI (n= 100) and the blue line indicating the weekly average excess deaths. In (c) model fits to the notification
excess death data (vertical bars) are shown under different assumptions of the proportion of total COVID-19 deaths that are ascertained by the notification
excess deaths. In both (b, c) the points show the government-reported excess deaths between 25 July and 1 August. The predicted hospital occupancy is
shown in (d), with the hospital capacity for Damascus shown with a dashed horizontal line, with the 2-week period in which hospitals were reported to be
first at capacity shown shaded in red. In (c, d) the 50% and 95% CI are shown with dark and light shaded regions respectively.
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beginning of July, with a clear peak at the end of July (Fig. 2b).
We therefore fitted the model to excess death notifications from
July onwards, using three approaches to reflect the uncertainty in
the fraction of total COVID-19 deaths captured by the excess
death notifications. For our baseline model for fitting to death
notifications, we assumed that excess deaths recorded within
online death notifications were a constant proportion of under-
lying excess deaths recorded by the Damascus Mortuary Office
between 25 July and 1 August (best fitted by an ascertainment
rate within the online death notifications of 40%, i.e. for every 2
death notifications there were five all-cause deaths).
Using the baseline model for death notifications, we estimate
2920 COVID-19 deaths (95% CI: 2480–3460) have occurred by 2
September 2020, which equates to 2% of COVID-19 deaths in
Damascus being reported. This estimate falls within the
sensitivity range for the estimate of under-ascertainment of
1–3% estimated earlier in Fig. 1. We also explored a maximum
upper and lower ascertainment fraction, either assuming that
100% of COVID-19 deaths are captured by the excess death
notifications or that only 27.5% of COVID-19 deaths are captured
by the notifications, which reflects the proportion of total all-
cause mortality in Damascus that was captured by the notifica-
tions in 2017–201929. This produced upper and lower estimates
of ascertainment of deaths in official COVID-19 reports of 1.5%
and 5% respectively. The upper estimate of 5%, however, is
unlikely to be reflective of the situation in Damascus, with
estimated hospital bed demand never exceeding capacity (Fig. 2d).
The lower estimate, by contrast, is close to our best-fitting model
in Fig. 1, in which 1.25% of deaths were ascertained, resulting in
health systems reaching capacity as reported at the end of July.
The excess death notification data thus provides supporting
evidence that both substantial under-reporting of COVID-19
deaths has occurred and confirms the recent declines in
transmission predicted when fitting to reported daily deaths has
indeed occurred in Damascus.
Estimates of COVID-19 epidemic spread during first wave in
Damascus. The scale of inferred under-ascertainment indicates a
starkly different epidemic from that suggested by reported deaths.
At the time of analysis (2 September) this had profound impli-
cations for the future trajectory of the epidemic. To reconstruct
the course of the epidemic to date and forecast its future trajec-
tory, we selected the best-fitting model from our default para-
meter set, which estimated that 1.25% of COVID-19 deaths are
ascertained, and projected it forward for 90 days, assuming that
interventions and population contact patterns remain constant
after 2 September 2020. Of the 4440 deaths we estimate to have
occurred in Damascus up to 2 September 2020 (Fig. 3a), 3820
COVID-19 deaths (95% CI: 2800–4800) are predicted to have
occurred between 1 July and 2 September 2020, comparable to the
estimated 4200 COVID-19 deaths (95% CI: 3710–5000) made
when fitting to the Facebook obituary deaths and assuming that
excess death notifications represent 27.5% of the total COVID-19
deaths. We estimate that there were 67,290 (95% CI:























































Fig. 3 Model-predicted deaths, infections, hospital occupancy and attack rates of COVID-19 for Damascus. The best-fitting model to excess deaths
(assumed baseline mortality as 32 deaths per day) is shown, which estimates that 1.25% of deaths are reported. In (a, b) the reported daily deaths and
infections due to COVID-19 respectively are shown, with the estimated excess deaths for a baseline mortality of 32 deaths per day shown in (a) as points.
A short delay is observed between infections in (a) and deaths in (b) reflecting the decrease in the delay from infection to death when there are insufficient
hospital and ICU beds. In (c) hospital occupancy over time is shown, with the dotted horizontal line showing the hospital capacity available. In (d) the
attack rate in Damascus is shown. In all plots, the median trajectory and 95% confidence interval (shaded region) is shown. A vertical dashed line is shown
for 2 September 2020 when the analysis was conducted. The 3-month projection assuming the current level of transmission is shown in each plot.
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September 2020. 9760 (95% CI: 6470–11,360) individuals were
estimated to be infected on 2 September 2020, including both
asymptomatic and symptomatic infections. Consequently, we
predict that a cumulative total of 39.0% (95% CI: 32.5–45.0%) of
the population in Damascus (2,394,000) had been infected by 2
September 2020 (Fig. 3d).
Assuming that Rt remained constant after 2 September, we
predict that the epidemic has passed its transmission peak, in
agreement with the peak observed in Facebook death notification
data. We estimate that 240 (95% CI: 170–280) new COVID-19
cases requiring hospital-level health interventions occurred on 2
September 2020, with the peak in hospitalisation requirement
predicted to have occurred 1 month earlier during the first week
of August 2020. However, despite the decrease in admissions, we
predict that there were insufficient hospital beds for the majority
of August 2020, with beds becoming available again from 28th
August 2020 (Fig. 3c). We predict that the indicators of declines
in transmission observed in Damascus will continue, with 49.1%
(95% CI: 41.7–54.7%) of the population being infected by the end
of 2020. We estimate that the effective reproduction number, Reff,
for Damascus was 0.87 (95% CI: 0.82–0.92) on 2 September 2020
(green curves in Supplementary Fig. 8a). In the absence of
immunity, we estimate that Rt (the reproduction number
unadjusted for population immunity), would have been 1.48
(95% CI: 1.34–1.65) on 2 September 2020 (blue curves in
Supplementary Fig. 8a). The decline in transmission in Damascus
observed by 2 September 2020 thus appears largely due to
increasing recovery-related immunity in the population and
the resultant reduction of susceptible individuals, with 40% of the
population estimated to have been infected by 2 September. The
value of Rt of 1.48 on 2 September 2020 is significantly lower than
the estimate of R0, which was estimated to be 2.77 (95% CI:
2.45–2.94). Given the absence of major public health interven-
tions in place on 2 September 2020, we attribute the majority of
reductions in Rt (i.e. decreases in transmission not due to
immunity) to be due to individual behavioural changes.
Model predictive performance and characterisation of
Damascus second wave. A notable challenge exists in conducting
research in settings with weakened health system governance. In
conducting this analysis, a number of authors of this study
requested to be acknowledged anonymously for security reasons
(see Acknowledgements section for their contributions as
authors). The methods taken to contact and collaborate safely on
this research with these authors introduced understandable
delays, highlighting the need for research findings to be com-
municated quickly through scientific reports and preprint
servers37. The results presented so far reflect analysis that was
conducted during September 2020. However, during revision of
this manuscript, a notable increase in COVID-19 cases and
deaths was recorded in Syria starting at the end of November. We
sought to incorporate these data on revision.
Between 2 September and the end of November, reported
COVID-19 deaths in Damascus decreased, with the weekly
average remaining below the peak seen during mid July (Fig. 4a).
The decrease in reported deaths aligned with the model-predicted
deaths that would have been reported after accounting for the
earlier estimated fraction of COVID-19 that are reported (1–3%)
(Fig. 4b). However, during this period, the epidemic was observed
to have spread to other governorates in Syria with the majority of
deaths occurring outside of Damascus, in particular in the Homs
governorate region (Fig. 4a). After December, a substantial
increase in COVID-19 mortality was observed in all governorates,
with numerous media reports of stretched healthcare systems in
other governorates38. In order to understand the drivers of the
second wave observed in Damascus, we sought to leverage the
death notification data to estimate the proportion of COVID-19
deaths during the second wave in Damascus and determine if the
dynamics were due to increased transmission or increased
reporting of COVID-19 mortality.
We scraped the number of death notifications uploaded to the
Facebook page by 13 January (Fig. 5a). A modest increase in
excess deaths estimated from death notifications was observed
starting in the second half of November (Fig. 5b). The increase,
however, was significantly smaller than observed during the peak
in July and August, suggesting that the ascertainment of COVID-
19 mortality in Damascus has increased since the first wave. To
estimate the changing reporting fraction, we fitted the model to
the death notification data. We assumed that the death
notifications capture 40% of the total all-cause mortality (as
estimated earlier as the best fit to the 8 days of excess deaths) and
estimated the proportion of COVID-19 deaths that have been
ascertained throughout the second wave. Using this model, we
estimate 3920 COVID-19 deaths (95% CI: 2910–4920) have
Model Predicted Deaths from 
2 September accounting for 
1.25% reporting of deaths
7-day moving averageOfficial Reported Deaths




Fig. 4 Predictive performance of second wave dynamics in Damascus. In (a) the official reported COVID-19 deaths in Syria are shown, with deaths in
Damascus (gold) and Homs (grey) governorates highlighted indicating the shifting burden COVID-19 has placed on regions outside of Damascus. In (b)
the performance of model projections made on 2 September (purple, median and 95% CI in shaded region) are shown compared against officially reported
COVID-19 deaths (black points) and the weekly rolling mean (green). Model predictions correctly suggested a decrease in COVID-19 deaths in Damascus
after the peak during the Summer, however, they failed to predict an increase in reported COVID-19 deaths towards the end of November.
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occurred by 13 January 2021, which equates to 5.75% of COVID-
19 deaths in Damascus being reported since the start of the
pandemic (Fig. 5c). However, COVID-19 mortality ascertainment
has changed considerably throughout the epidemic. Earlier, we
estimated that 2% of COVID-19 deaths had been reported by 2
September based solely on the death notifications data reported
by this date. However, between 3 September and 13 January, we
estimate that 12.6% of COVID-19 deaths in Damascus have been
reported. In addition, the ascertainment of COVID-19 deaths
throughout the pandemic has generally increased (Fig. 5d),
however, it decreased considerably during the observed peak in
excess mortality during July and August. Lastly, the obituary
notification data suggests that if transmission remains the same
that the second wave will not be larger than the first wave and is
predicted to fall over the next 3 months (Fig. 5c). Through the use
of the death notifications, we are able to highlight the stark
difference between the epidemic dynamics suggested by the
official reported statistics and that inferred from death
notifications.
Discussion
The apparent absence of high levels of mortality in Syria, given
the extent of transmission occurring elsewhere in the Middle East
region, is surprising considering the transmissibility of a new
pathogen that was both anticipated and borne-out in other
countries. Based on government reports of all-cause mortality in
the governorate of Damascus over the period 25 July–1 August,
we conclude that the reported COVID-19 deaths only capture a
small proportion of the true number of deaths due to COVID-19
in the city. Despite the estimate of excess mortality only being
available for just over a week, we estimate that 1.25% (sensitivity
range 1–3%) of deaths from COVID-19 have been reported in
Damascus during this period. As a consequence, it is likely that
the epidemic in Damascus is in a much more advanced stage than
the reported data would suggest, with ~40% of the population
infected during the first wave.
In this analysis we relied on two supplementary and unor-
thodox measures of COVID-19 burden to inform the ascertain-
ment of deaths reflected in official death statistics: 8 days of excess
mortality data and publicly uploaded obituary notifications.
These measures have limitations in terms of completeness and
representativeness which make estimating the precise extent of
spread within Damascus to date impossible. For example, in
Supplementary Fig. 6 we demonstrated how an unmitigated
epidemic leading to 80% attack rates could explain the official
reported data equally well if we assume that deaths are only
reported for people who die in hospitals. However, when viewed
together they provide a consistent picture of a much higher level
of mortality and a more mature epidemic than official data would
suggest. Unfortunately, the absence of consistent and reliable
estimates of excess mortality is not unique to Damascus and as
such alternative data sources are likely to be needed in many
settings to understand how widespread COVID-19 may be.
Additionally, although the notification data are suggestive of
substantial under-ascertainment of deaths throughout the out-
break, alternative data sources such as this are also likely to be
subject to changing biases over time which are hard to predict.
For example, excess death notifications decreased during April
and May, possibly due to the most restrictive COVID-19 sup-












Fig. 5 Characterising the dynamics of the second wave in Damascus. In (a) we show the number of obituary notifications uploaded daily to the
community maintained ‘Damascus Mortality’ Facebook page. In (b), the daily inferred excess death notifications are shown, with error bars showing the
95% CI and the blue line indicating the weekly average excess deaths (n= 100). In (c) model fits (purple, median and 95% CI in shaded region) to the
notification excess death data (vertical green bars) are shown under the assumption that 40% of total COVID-19 deaths are ascertained by the notification
excess deaths, which correctly captures the excess mortality reported by the Syrian government between 25 July and 1 August (black dots). The model-
predicted COVID-19 deaths in (c) are significantly greater than the official reported COVID-19 deaths (blue bars), with the reporting fraction (official
deaths divided by model-predicted deaths) since July shown in (d). In (d) the 2-week rolling average reporting fraction is shown, with the 95% CI shown
between the dashed lines.
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<0.5% of death notifications were attributed to Christians, which
is likely lower than the percentage of Christians estimated to be
living in Damascus despite recent reports of Christians leaving
the country39. Assuming that the proportion of Christians living
in Damascus have comparable age and risk profiles to the
population in Damascus we would have expected a higher pro-
portion of death notifications attributed to Christians. Under-
standing these biases and exploring how the pandemic has spread
across different demographics is key to leveraging alternative data
sources and highlights the considerable benefits of regular and
complete reporting of excess deaths.
On original submission of this analysis, we predicted a
downwards trajectory of the epidemic after 2 September if
transmission stayed the same, while cautioning the need for the
reductions in transmission achieved by behavioural changes to be
maintained. This prediction was largely accurate, however, from
December transmission increased, with the effective reproduction
number increasing above 1 and Rt (reproduction number in the
absence of immunity) estimated to have increased to 1.2. It seems
unlikely that any country will see transmission return to initial R0
values in the near future due to greater levels of COVID-19
awareness globally compared to early 202040. However, higher
levels of attack rate than estimated in Damascus have been
observed in other parts of the world41, demonstrating the need
for continued awareness. If human behaviour towards COVID-19
relaxes, it remains possible that transmission could increase
further with Damascus, despite the high attack rates we
estimate to have occurred thus far. This would likely have sig-
nificant secondary impacts on overall mortality in Damascus.
One such impact would be the continued toll on medical
personnel who have reportedly been heavily affected by the epi-
demic, with reports of at least 60 Syrian doctors, mostly in
Damascus, dying from COVID-19 by 18th August 202042. High
levels of healthcare worker infection and mortality would further
decrease the limited capacity to effectively treat COVID-19
patients in all areas of Syria, with UN reports of up to 70% of
health-workers having left Syria or been killed during ongoing
conflict43.
In our approach we have relied on excess mortality data, which
is dependent on having reliable estimates of baseline mortality,
which we sourced from previous annual estimates. However,
there are undoubtedly indirect effects that COVID-19 places on
healthcare systems, which are hard to quantify but expected to
increase all-cause mortality44. However, even when we doubled
our baseline (non COVID-19) mortality assumption, we still
estimate considerable under-ascertainment of COVID-19 deaths,
with a maximum of 3% of such deaths being reported during the
first wave. Another assumption was our use of age-stratified IFRs
taken from Verity et al.34 which assume a standard of healthcare
comparable to that available in China at the beginning of the
pandemic. We explored this assumption in our sensitivity ana-
lysis and introduced scenarios in which poorer health outcomes
occurred, e.g. due to insufficient oxygen provision. This did not
change the inferred level of death under-ascertainment, but did
yield lower estimated attack rates due to the higher case fatality
rates assumed (Supplementary Fig. 9). Given that 8% of func-
tional public hospitals lacked oxygen support45 it is highly
plausible that the default parameter estimate of attack rates of
39.0% is an upper estimate, and the true value lies closer to the
estimate of 30.0% (95% CI: 24.9–34.3%) assuming poorer health
outcomes. Further evidence for the lower attack rate could be
suggested by the observed second wave, however, either 30% or
40% attack rate is still susceptible to second waves occurring if Rt
increases. Central to this is an urgent need for testing to be
increased, with only 18,238 COVID-19 tests conducted in
Damascus as of 24 August 2020 (last date for which total tests
conducted in Damascus were reported) (Supplementary Fig. 10).
By 19 December, the Syrian Ministry of Health reported ~80,000
COVID-19 tests had been conducted across Syria46.
The analysis presented here was only possible because the
Damascus governorate office published mortality data at a key
time in the Damascus epidemic. Although this was only 8 days of
data, the epidemic trajectory after these dates aligns with an initial
plateau in reported COVID-19 deaths in Damascus after 2
August. Further support for this epidemic trajectory was sug-
gested by changes in community-uploaded obituary notifications
to Facebook from August onwards. Unfortunately, after the first
wave in Damascus occurred, a notable rise in reported cases and
deaths was observed in other governorates of Syria. This could
signal that the large epidemic in Damascus seeded epidemics
within other regions. For example, epidemics could have been
seeded from Damascus when inter-governorate travel bans were
lifted, a pattern observed in other countries47. Alternatively,
increases in testing capacity that have occurred in Syria could
mean that other governorates are at earlier points in their epi-
demics compared to Damascus for the same number of deaths21.
Neither hypothesis can be explored effectively without a more
reliable mortality data source in other governorate regions,
however, reports of overwhelmed health systems in Idlib do
suggest that larger epidemics than suggested by official statistics
are occurring38. While the level of under-ascertainment across
Syria may be similar to that in Damascus, this seems unlikely
given the heterogeneity in health infrastructure and testing
resources. This need for more reliable and regular data streams
for measuring mortality, and for transparency in publishing
available data, is equally pressing for many conflict-affected set-
tings. However, in the absence of such data, alternative data
sources will have to be leveraged to characterise the dynamics of
COVID-19 in many parts of the world. Our analysis provides one
example of the level of data that must be included if we are to
understand the extent to which the COVID-19 pandemic may
have occurred unobserved to date.
Methods
Model framework and fitting. We extend a previously published3age-structured
COVID-19 transmission model to fit to daily reported deaths in Damascus gov-
ernorate (Supplementary Table 4). As of 2 September 2020, 120 COVID-19 deaths
had been reported in Syria, of which 60 were in Damascus governorate (Supple-
mentary Fig. 5). During this time, a number of non-pharmaceutical interventions
were implemented in Damascus, including curfews, school and work closures and
suspension of mosque visits However, most of these are reported to have been
implemented prior to 11th May 2020 with many relaxed on 26th May (Supple-
mentary Table 5). As in our previous work modelling healthcare burden in
LMICs48, we estimate changes in transmission from relative changes in individual-
level mobility (and by extension, patterns of mixing and contact relevant to the
transmission of respiratory viruses) as quantified in the Google Community
Mobility Reports49. However, mobility data is only available in 130 countries,
which does not include Syria. In countries without mobility data, we estimate
mobility using a Boosted Regression Tree model (Supplementary Fig. 11), trained
to predict mobility patterns based on government policies, as quantified by the
ACAPs Government-measures dataset (Supplementary Table 3)50. We then esti-
mate the effect of changes in mobility on SARS-CoV-2 transmission by fitting to
the time series of daily COVID-19 deaths, allowing the effect size of mobility to
differ after interventions are relaxed to reflect changes in human behaviour in
response to COVID-1951.
Under-ascertainment is modelled by assuming that only a proportion of the
model-predicted deaths on a given day are reported. When fitting the model, we
consider the daily time series of deaths as a partially-observed Markov process. We
scan across a range of assumed death ascertainments to relate the Markov process
to the observed realisations of death. Reported deaths are assumed to follow a
negative binomial distribution (with standard deviation equal to 2 to allow for
observed over-dispersion of counts) with an expected mean value given by the
model-predicted deaths multiplied by the level of under-ascertainment. In this way
we make the assumption that the trajectory of reported deaths is informative of the
true trajectory of the epidemic after accounting for under-ascertainment.
Model fitting was carried out within a Bayesian framework, using a
Metropolis–Hastings Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) based sampling
scheme. We draw 100 parameter sets from the MCMC chain and use these
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parameters to simulate epidemic trajectories. For each under-ascertainment
assumed, we estimate the likelihood of the model fit by calculating the mean log
likelihood for the 100 model-predicted deaths during 25 July–1 August compared
against the government-reported excess deaths during the same period. Excess
deaths are similarly assumed to follow a negative binomial distribution with an
expected mean value given by the model-predicted deaths, with standard deviation
2. Full details of the transmission model and model fitting are available in the
Supplementary Material.
Mortality data. Reported daily mortality and incidence data for Damascus was
sourced from the Syrian Ministry of Health52. Excess all-cause mortality data between
25 July and 1 August was sourced from a statement by the Damascus governorate28.
Obituary notification data was sourced from a publicly available Facebook page
—‘Damascus Mortality’36. Duplicated images were removed before identifying the
local time and date at which the image was uploaded to the page. We used Google
Cloud’s Vision AI53 to select death notifications based on being labelled as ‘Text’
AND ‘Document’, with images matching only one identifier manually assessed as a
notification. The date of death for each notification was assumed to be the date the
image was uploaded after adjusting for the mean delay from recorded death to
notification upload, identified from translating a random selection of 250
notifications. The same 250 notifications were used to estimate the proportion of
notifications reporting deaths outside of Damascus, which was then subtracted
from the total observed daily death notifications. Excess mortality based on notifi-
cations was finally calculated by subtracting the baseline number of notifications
per day in 2017–2019, estimated for each month to account for seasonality in
mortality.
Data ethics. The Facebook mortality dataset consists of data scraped from a public
Facebook page related to the date and timing of photos uploaded to the page.
Google’s mobility data consists of aggregated, anonymized sets of data from users
who have chosen to turn on the location history setting. Lastly, the all-cause
mortality data between 25 July and 1 August 2020 was obtained from the
Damascus Governorate’s Official Facebook page, which publically shared details of
mortality during this period.
Reporting summary. Further information on research design is available in the Nature
Research Reporting Summary linked to this article.
Data availability
All data used in and generated by this analysis are available in an R research
compendium at https://github.com/mrc-ide/syria-covid-ascertainment54. This includes
external datasets: Google mobility data (https://www.google.com/covid19/mobility/) and
the ACAPs intervention data (https://www.acaps.org/covid-19-government-measures-
dataset).
Code availability
All software code and analysis scripts are available in an R research compendium at
https://github.com/mrc-ide/syria-covid-ascertainment54.
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